construction of an apartment building (a rather standard endeavor) usually involves 30 to 40 individual subcontractors in 100 to 150 separate activities. 2 Assigning subtasks of a complex project to subcontractors is also fairly common. In the UK, the proportions of construction employees employed by subcontractors from 1983 to 1998 grew by 20 percent. 3 Between 2008 and 2011, the number of independent contractors increased by 12 percent in the UK, and in Australia, 17.2 percent of the workforce in 2012 was self-employed (8.5 percent as independent contractors). These are just a few examples of the growing trend to develop projects by employing several specialized subcontractors instead of a single company.
construction of an apartment building (a rather standard endeavor) usually involves 30 to 40 individual subcontractors in 100 to 150 separate activities. 2 Assigning subtasks of a complex project to subcontractors is also fairly common. In the UK, the proportions of construction employees employed by subcontractors from 1983 to 1998 grew by 20 percent. 3 Between 2008 and 2011, the number of independent contractors increased by 12 percent in the UK, and in Australia, 17.2 percent of the workforce in 2012 was self-employed (8.5 percent as independent contractors). These are just a few examples of the growing trend to develop projects by employing several specialized subcontractors instead of a single company.
Although this idea is increasingly popular, it isn't immediately clear how to organize the market both for the project's issuer (in this article, called the client) and its subcontractors (called agents). Interaction between agents applying to work on a project and the client is captured by the hiring-a-team problem. [4] [5] [6] Agents have private costs for participating in a project and can have different skills; thus, only certain teams are able to complete the project on time. The client organizes an auction in which individual agents place their bids, in this case, their required salaries. After collecting the bids, the client selects the cheapest feasible team: the set of agents able to complete the project on time with the lowest total bid. C onsider a complex project-typically, it's involved, intricate, and consists of many varied yet interrelated parts. The successful completion of such a project requires coordinated cooperation of several experts-both people and companies-often organized as teams of subcontractors. 1 For instance, the www.computer.org/intelligent Ieee InTeLLIGenT SySTeMS
A I A n d E c o n o m I c s
We can generalize the hiring-ateam problem by exploring two types of markets. The original approach corresponds to the centralized setting: agents communicate only with the client by issuing their required salaries (or bids), and it's the client's respon-sibility to select an appropriate team. Our main contribution here lies in considering a different organization of the market, one in which agents first form teams and then bid for the project as consolidated groups rather than as individuals. Because the organization of these agents into teams isn't managed by a central entity, we refer to this setting as decentralized. To the best of our knowledge, this formulation of the problem is novel and leads to a new class of games. It even has a natural interpretation: a client might not want to coordinate a project and deal with individual subcontractors but instead expects subcontractors to coordinate among themselves and propose a bid for the whole project.
Additionally, we generalize the hiring-a-team problem by considering two types of agent compensation. In the project salary model (corresponding to the original approach), agents are paid for their work irrespectively of their contributed effort. In contrast, we propose a new payment model, the hourly salary model, in which agents are paid for their time spent working on the project.
Throughout this article, we assume that we're given an oracle that, for a given team, can determine whether this team is feasible, that is, whether it can successfully complete the project. In particular, given a budget and the requested agents' salaries, the oracle can be asked to find a feasible team or the cheapest feasible team. Elsewhere 7 we show how to create such an oracle for a concrete scheduling model (which moreover generalizes a commodity auction); we also determine the exact complexity of checking whether a given team is feasible in such scheduling model.
Our approach generalizes two models: commodity auctions 8 and path auctions. 9 In a commodity auction, there exists a set of items I = {i 1 , i 2 , …, i q }, and agents own certain subsets of I. A team is feasible if the agents have all the items from I. A commodity auction can be mapped to our problem by considering that I is a set of independent activities; an agent owning a subset corresponds to an agent having skills to complete these activities. A path auction has a graph G with two distinguished vertices: a source s and a target t. The agents correspond to the vertices in the graph, and some vertices are connected by edges. A team is feasible if the participating agents form a path from s to t.
Because we consider teams of agents with sufficient skills, our model resembles cooperative skill games 10 and coalitional resource games. 11 These games, however, consider the stability of the grand coalition and interaction between its members. In contrast, our approach is to expose the competition among multiple teams. Thus, we don't apply the typical cooperative game theory concepts and, instead, model agents' cooperation and competition as a noncooperative game. Our approach is thus closer to endogenous formation of coalitions. [12] [13] [14] In this article, we identify and formalize a new class of coalition games that extend the hiring-a-team games. We propose concepts to characterize the stability of the winning teams and study their computational complexity. Table 1 summarizes our results. All the proofs omitted from the main text are provided elsewhere. 7 A Complex Project as a Game: A Formal Model We consider a game in which a client (an issuer) submits a single complex project. The client has a certain valuation n of the project, which is the maximal price that she can pay for completing the project.
There's a set N = (1, 2, …, n) of n agents. For each agent i, we define φ > 0 i m to be the agent's minimal salary for which i is willing to work. This minimal salary can correspond to the agent's personal cost of participating in the project. The agent prefers to work for φ i m than not to work (and if they work, then they prefer to work for a higher salary). The value, φ i m is private to the agent-neither the issuer nor the other agents know φ i m . A subset of the agents' population N forms a team to work on the project; our core contribution is on how this process should be organized. A team  is a triple
consisting of the set of participating agents
a salary function
assigning salaries to member agents; and the total cost of the team
, the total amount of money earned by the participants of  . Salaries are discrete (not only money is discrete, but it's also common in real-world auctions to specify a minimal difference between two successive bids). However, to derive some computational results, in some clearly marked places, we assume that the salaries can be rational numbers.
The same team can organize the work of its members on the project in various ways with varying efforts from participants. To capture this property, we introduce a notion of a schedule,
, that assigns to each member of a team the amount of time the agent needs to spend on the project. Of course, there could exist many schedules for a single team. 7 We consider two models of agent compensation. Let  φ ( ) In the project salary model, agents are interested in earning as much money as possible. The hourly salary model represents agents who are interested in having the highest possible hourly wage; thus, an agent would prefer to work t i = 1 time unit with a salary f i = 3 to working t i = 2 time units with a salary f i = 2.
Different schedules can result in different completion times for the project. If the schedule results in a completion time that's satisfactory for the client, we say that the schedule is feasible. For some teams, there might not exist a feasible schedule (say, if the members lack certain skills). We assume that an oracle can answer whether a given schedule is feasible or not. This very general setting can be instantiated by providing a concrete oracle. For instance, elsewhere 7 we show that by appropriately specifying the oracle, our results can be applied to both commodity and path auctions. We also show there how to replace the general oracle with a concrete scheduling model. 
Centralized Formation of Teams
In the centralized model, agents submit their asking salaries f i directly to the client. The client, having the asking salaries, wants to form the cheapest feasible team. We fi rst show that this problem reduces to FFT, the problem of fi nding a feasible team. Then, we analyze the optimal bidding strategies of agents. Next, we show that no set of agents  ′ N can make a collaborative action f after which the payoff for all  ′ N agents will be greater than previously. In contrast, assume that there exists such a set of agents  ′ N and such an action f. First, we consider the case when the payoff of some agent Interestingly, there's no analogous result for the hourly salary model. 7 The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive, but it requires considering all feasible teams and therefore it leads to a potentially high computational complexity. Finding an efficient algorithm for the problem of finding an SNE in the project salary model is open. On the other hand, if the salaries of the agents can be rational numbers, we can fi nd the salary function in an SNE by a polynomial reduction to FCFT. This result is particularly meaningful if the salaries have high granularity; rounding such a rational solution gives an integral solution that's nearly perfect.
Proposition 2.
In the project salary model, if the salaries are rational, then fi nding an SNE can be solved in time O(n 3 log(nv)FCFT), w here FCFT is the complexity of FCFT. Checking whether a given vector of the asking salaries <f i >, i ∈ N is an SNE can be solved in time O(FCFT), where FCFT is the complexity of FCFT.
Decentralized Formation of Teams
If agents can communicate and coordinate their strategies, they form teams and bid for projects as consortiums. We propose the concept of a (rigorously) strongly winning team, in which no subset of agents can successfully deviate. We show how to characterize (rigorously) strongly winning teams and how to reduce the problem of fi nding them to FCFT. We show that the strongly winning teams might not exist, so we introduce the concept of a weakly winning team. We prove that a weakly winning team always exists (provided there's a feasible team). We demonstrate how to reduce the problem of fi nding weakly winning teams to FCFT.
We model the behavior of the agents as a strategic game. Agent i's action is a triple N agree to participate in  ′. Otherwise, the payoff of i is 0.
Strongly Winning Teams
As the payoffs depend on whether the others agree to cooperate, rather than the Nash equilibrium, an SNE should be used. In Defi nition 1, we propose an even more stable equilibrium concept-the rigorously SNE (RSNE), which requires that no subset of agents can deviate such that each agent gets a payoff at least as good as its payoff before deviating (instead of SNE's strictly better). Our approach is motivated by cautious agents. In an SNE, agents have no incentive to deviate if they get the same payoff; however, they also have no incentive not to deviate. Yet, any deviation will result in a serious payoff loss for some agents (changing their payoffs from a positive f to zero). A cautious agent will prefer not to be exposed to the possibility of such a loss.
Defi nition 1. The vector of actions
π is an RSNE if and only if there's no subset of agents  N . such that the agents from  N can make a collaborative action  , after which the payoff of each agent i from  N would be at least equal to his or her payoff under π, and the payoff of at least one agent i ∈ N would improve.
An RSNE requires that the payoff of at least one agent i ∈ N must change as we treat as equivalent the teams with the same payoffs. For instance, in a game with three agents, a, b, and c, if team a,b gets a positive payoff, it doesn't matter whether c plays <{c}, v + 1> or <∅, v + 1>: in both cases, all payoffs are the same (recall that v is the client's maximal budget for the project).
Below we introduce additional definitions that help characterize the RSNE in our games. The result in Theorem 2 stated for RSNEs transfers to SNEs after a slight modifi cation of the payoffs. It's suffi cient to assume that an agent playing an empty team receives a slightly higher payoff than if he or she plays a nonempty losing team. In other words, this modifi cation associates some small costs with the preparation of a bid by the agents. Hereafter, whenever we mention a strictly winning team, we assume that the agents incur such costs. To state the result for SNEs, we also need to use the defi nition of a team  being strictly implicitly endangered by  ′. This defi nition differs from being implicitly endangered only by not requiring the agents from (such a condition can be checked by enumerating the payoff functions that assign to each agent his or her minimal salary, the salary that he or she obtains in  , or the next higher salary). Below, we characterize RSNEs in the project salary model even more precisely.
Defi nition 2. A feasible team  is explicitly endangered by a team
 ′ if  ′ is feasible,
Lemma 1.
In the project salary model, the set of agents participating in a rigorously strongly winning team is the same as the set of agents participating in the cheapest feasible team.
Lemma 2.
In the project salary model, the bid of a strongly winning team is equal to the maximal allowed price v.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that the problem of fi nding a strongly winning team reduces to the problem of fi nding a feasible team. The problem thus becomes an optimization problem; the strategic behavior of agents has no impact. 7 An RSNE (and even an SNE) might not exist in some instances. , . At least one of the agents, let's say a, has to get salary at most equal to 2.5. However, agents a and c, with salaries equal to 3 and 2, respectively, can form a feasible team in which both a and c get better payoffs.  Weakly Winning Teams Proposition 3 suggests that a notion of a strongly winning team is too restrictive. Team {a, c} can profi t by deviating, for example, by playing f(a) = 3 and f(c) = 2. But a shouldn't be willing to deviate, as {a, c} with payoffs f(a) = 3 and f(c) = 2 isn't stable (for instance, team {b, c} can play f(b) = 2 and f(c) = 3 and successfully deviate from {a, c}). In the above example, no team strongly wins, even though intuitively there are teams that would agree to work together on the project. Thus, we propose a weaker notion of a winning team.
Defi nition 3.
A feasible team  is weakly winning if it isn't explicitly endangered by any team and for each feasible team  ′ such that  is implicitly endangered by  ′, there exists a feasible team  ′′ such that  ′ is explicitly or implicitly endangered by  ′′. 
Proposition 5.
In the project salary model, if the salaries of the agents can be rational numbers, the problem of fi nding a weakly winning team and the problem of checking whether a team  ′ is weakly winning can be solved in time O(n 5 log(nv)FCFT).
Finding an effi cient algorithm for the same problem with discrete salaries is still an open question.
Mechanism Design
In this section, we analyze two mechanisms that a client can use to fi nd a it's suffi cient to assume that an agent playing an empty team receives a slightly higher payoff than if he or she plays a nonempty losing team. In the second approach, we use the first-price auction, in which teams participate. In a standard first-price auction, an item's price starts from some minimal value (the least preferred outcome for the owner of the item). Bidders place bids for the current price. The asking price is gradually increased until there are no further bids; the last bidder wins. Similarly, in our proposed auction, the auction starts from the original budget v (the least preferred outcome for the client); the asking price gradually decreases. Teams place bids for the current asking price (as in the standard first-price auction, multiple bids for the same asking price aren't allowed). The auction stops when no feasible team bids lower than the current asking price. This procedure leads to the concept of an auction-winning team. 
